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3ABSTRACT
In the design of automatic control systems for industrial process plants the designer has to
realise that he cannot possibly foresee and analyse all relevant operational conditions of the
plant; in certain circumstances he must rely upon an intelligent human operator for the iden-
tification and correction of abnormal plant behaviour.  He must consider that the operator, for
his diagnosis and decision, needs information describing the anatomy and behaviour of the
plant that is not needed during normal operation, as well as detailed information on the actual
operational state.
In this situation the digital process computer and the related new media for information dis-
play offer a great capacity for storing information resulting from plant design considerations
as well as a highly efficient means of reduction and conditioning of the information to be dis-
played to the operator.
In the search for information describing the properties of the intelligent operator to facilitate
the design of advanced display systems, published records of accidents and incidents in nu-
clear plants and of aircraft accidents have been reviewed.
In this review, emphasis is placed not upon cases initiated by human operators, but upon
those cases in which the human operator has failed to correct abnormal conditions.  The
findings are correlated with a simple functional model of the operator which divides his task
into detection, identification, decision, and manipulation.
In particular the cases indicating difficulties in the task of identification are discussed as they
place special demands on the display coding.  In the identification task the operator is faced
with a conflict between different goals minimisation of average cost or of immediate risk, and
different mental models are available to him.  The situation is clearly exemplified by Lalande,
who failed to discover Neptune in 1795 - (Jerome S. Bruner, A study of thinking, p. 104).

51 INTRODUCTION
In highly automated plants a variety of tasks must still be allocated to the human operator, as
the automation of routine tasks in itself creates the need for supervision and checking.  Ide-
ally all tasks should be evaluated and planned in advance by the system designer, and to-day
the process computer should be considered as it is an excellent tool for processing and storing
of information and procedures to support the operator.
However, in all plants situations arise that cannot be foreseen and evaluated in advance, and
during these situations plant safety may depend upon the ability of the human operator to
evaluate the circumstances and to improvise the proper correcting actions.  In that case the
operator has a need for access to a variety of state data from which he can select the proper
set to be used in the actual situation.
In conventional control systems the data are presented to the operator by analogue devices
(meters, recorders) in a way that has evaluated slowly on the basis of operational experience
gained during the simultaneous development of the plants themselves.  In these systems the
operator has direct access to all data; he may perceive the pattern of several indications si-
multaneously, or he may choose and read individual data accurately.
The continued development of computer systems will bring about a rapid change in the tech-
nology of data display also in industrial plants.  As the designer has no explicit formulation of
the operator's diagnostic procedures, the best way to ensure proper action by the operator in
critical situations appears, even in computer systems, to be that of presenting him with state
data in such a way that the tradition from operating experience is maintained, i.e. presentation
of measured data and their time history in analogue codes without relying too much on digital
data presentation.
To utilize in full the advanced data-conditioning ability of computer systems we need more
knowledge of the mental transformation models of the operator in abnormal situations, i.e*'
the nature of the system information used by the operator to generate his actions on the basis
of the data presented to him.
In this paper some conclusions are drawn from a review of reported accidents in order to iso-
late critical aspects of the man - machine co-operation.  The attention is focussed on the task
of identifying abnormal conditions, and a simple model of the operator in a system is pre-
sented as a basis for a discussion of the nature of his transformation models and the shift in
model and goal needed in abnormal situations.  Finally some experiments in trouble shooting
tasks are discussed to evaluate the models actually at work in diagnostic tasks, and the cate-
gories of mental models with related displays considered in experiments planned for indus-
trial environments are mentioned.
2 REVIEW OF ACCIDENT REPORTS
The human operator has an ability to circumvent deficiencies in the man -machine interface
by adaptation to a degree that makes one expect inappropriate display coding to have signifi-
cant influence only during very complex or stressed periods.  It thus appears important to turn
6to accident reports to find some indication of the major problems in man - machine communi-
cation.
The number of thoroughly reported major incidents or accidents is very low compared with
the complexity of the situations and the number of parameters involved.  Statistical informa-
tion on isolated aspects of the human role to be used for 'design purposes cah therefore not be
gained from such reports.  For this information to be obtained the complex situations have to
be broken down to a coincidence of elementary events for which data can be found in isolated
experiments or human data banks; Swain (1969), Ablitt (1968).
With this in mind, accidents reported in the nuclear field have been reviewed.  In the present
paper reference is made to 29 cases with major consequences to plant or personnel reported
by "Nuclear Safety" as "Current Events" during the period 1959 to 1965; the accidents in-
clude fifteen at reactor plants, nine at chemical treatment plants for radioactive or fissile ma-
terial and five major cases which arose during handling of radioactive material in hot-cell
plants.
Because of the small number of cases and their complexity, only very general aspects - ac-
cording-to subjective judgement - can be extracted, but the following considerations are
deemed to be relevant in the present discussion: Most of the accidents are initiated during pe-
riods with non-routine operations (e.g. initial operation, experiments', maintenance).  Only a
few (-5) are related to operational conditions that have developed into routine, and they are
all initiated by technical failures.
Accidents initiated by human mal-operation amount to roughly three quarters of the total
number of reported cases, and only in a few (3) cases do simple accidental operations or ma-
nipulations ' seem to be of essential consequence, presumably because such simple malopera-
tions have been foreseen and taken into account during system design.  In agreement with
this, simple maloperations only contribute to the reported accidents if they coincide with
other non-routine conditions.
Only in very few cases have the operators had no possibility of preventing accidents due to
fast physical reactions (e.g. explosions.), and, taking both the process and the system knowl-
edge of the operator into consideration, it appears that in nearly all cases the operators would
have been able to make an appropriate decision and carry through the action if the actual state
of the system had been known to them.
The main conclusion of this review is that a most significant aspect of the human role in the
reported accidents has been the difficulty of the operator in non-routine situations to identify
the conditions under which to operate.
In spite of the low number of cases it seems reasonable to discuss a few aspects in more de-
tail.
In approximately one third of the cases a significant feature of the development of the acci-
dent is that a prescribed procedure has not been followed.  This means that it has been real-
ized in advance that infrequent, but dangerous deviations in some state parameters may occur,
which would not easily be detected by the operator, and therefore procedures taking such in-
frequent deviations into account have been devised.  As such procedures are not operationally
7optimal in normal circumstances, they are very likely to be ''improved" by the operator during
his normal work at the expense of safety margin.
As the operator's capability of adaptation is one of the very reasons for his presence in the
plant, it seems appropriate to try to remedy the drawbacks of his adaptation by supplying him
with adequate information before resort is had to "stricter administrative control".  This dis-
crepancy between situation and human procedure has been typical of the cases related to han-
dling of radioactive sources e.g. in hot cells.
As regards chemical plants for treatment of radioactive and fissile material(solutions) it leaps
to the eye t-hat a typical aspect has been the operator's difficulty in identifying the working
situation because of the many parameters in a complex system of valves, tubes and vessels,
combined with a non-routine task. Therefore the operator acts inappropriately, and he is not
able to detect the consequences of his actions because additional cues for detection are not
developed in due time.
Because of the nature of the plants and processes in question the accidents in chemical plants
follow immediately upon the inappropriate operator actions, whereas this is not typical of
cases related to reactor plants.
It seems to be typical of accidents in reactor plants that the plants have been left in an abnor-
mal or unsafe state after periods of special, non- routine operations, repairs, experiments,
calibrations, or the like. In the reported cases these states turn into accidents because the con-
sole operator does not detect the abnormal state as insufficient data are displayed, or because
he does not interpret the data correctly; it is typical that he does not trust data indicating in-
frequent, but risky states.
Reactor plants are designed in such a way that maloperations may very likely result in auto-
matic shut-down, and to discover whether human performance has different consequences
when such a shut-down feature is not present, a review of some hundred reported accidents
within air transport have been made. I.C.A.0. (1959 - 1967)-
Even in such cases with no automatic safety action simple human maloperations plays only a
small part in the initiation of accidents, and technical failures play a significant part only in a
minority of the cases. The majority of the failures can be attributed to the human operator in
complex, non-routine situations when he has to adjust his procedures while taking many pa-
rameters into consideration (typical of landing operations in bad weather). In our context it is
of value to note in the aviation records a clear indication of the human difficulty in taking
many parameters into consideration in a stressed situation, especially if the parameters are not
presented in the same way (landing in bad weather with both visual and instrument refer-
ence).
Very few cases are reported of aeroplanes left unsafe during "shut-down" periods, presuma-
bly because work during such periods has developed into established routine, which is not the
case in the nuclear systems considered.
It is also interesting to compare the results of a review of reported accidents with the figures
obtained by means of reporting systems that include elementary technical and human faults
during plant operations. Such a system in operation at the Health and Safety Branch, U. K.,
8(Ablitt 1969) has shown 10% human failures, which indicates that human failures are more
difficult to foresee by system designers than are technical failures, and thus have a higher
probability of developing into serious accidents. It is also interesting to note that the ratio of
accidental maloperation to in- correct action is 1:5 in the British data, which show that even
in cases of simple faults which do not develop any further, the accidental maloperation  is of
minor importance.
My conclusion is that the critical task of the display system will be to support the operator in
the identification of his working conditions during abnormal periods such as periods of initial
operation, start-up after major repairs or overhaul, or periods of technical failure.  At such
times the operator has to consider sets of data describing a great number of parameters; he has
to judge the internal relations in such data sets to identify the abnormal state of the system,
and parameters of no concern to him during normal operations may be of vital importance for
this task.  To fulfil this requirement, integrated analogue or graphic displays seem to be more
appropriate than alpha-numeric displays.
3 OPERATOR MODEL
It is well known from everyday life and from experiments, Miller (1956), that the human data
input capacity is greatly limited, but also that information input capacity is very great in cases
of appropriate coding i.e. when data are arranged in patterns related to the mental model of
the system available to the operator.
To come closer to a formulation of critical aspects of display coding, the functions of the op-
erator in industrial plants have been discussed, Rasmussen (1968), and a simple schematic
model of the operator as seen by a system designer has been formulated to show the outlines
of the mental transformation model available to the operator in different tasks.
According to this model, shown in fig. 1, the tasks of the operator may be divided into four
separate categories:
First.  The normal working routine is an automatic - or unconscious matching of sensed data
patterns with trained response patterns.  This mode is initiated automatically by the appropri-
ate data patterns and is based upon long-term training in pattern recognition and response co-
ordination.  The typical tasks will be regulating and tracking tasks and routine sequences.
The transformation model of the operator (the system information stored) will be a trained,
unconscious plant response model with no relation to physical understanding or knowledge of
the process.
In this mode of functioning the operator may come across data patterns that have no corre-
sponding trained response pattern, and these patterns may be perceived - or detected - and
cause a conscious pattern identification.
Secondly.  When an unusual situation is thus perceived, it will be evaluated more or less
thoroughly, additional state data will be searched, and to classify the condition the pattern
will be correlated to a mental model of the system and to the actual goal of operation.  The
situation may be classified as a condition known from the past according to the operator's ex-
perience - which in this context stands for a formal behaviour model of the plant based upon
9system information extracted from system performance.  In this case the situation will be met
by an alternative response based upon trained co-ordination.
Thirdly.  Where the conditions are not identified as familiar to the operator, he must, on the
basis of fundamental education in plant anatomy, dynamic properties and the physical inter-
pretation of the data available, evaluate the situation according to a mental model, taking into
account the physical properties of the plant.
Whereas the goal in the trained response has to a ma-or degree been to optimize the average
pay-off, the operator, in  is choice between different hypotheses about the plant conditions,
may aim at different goals: a "scientific" goal to explain the behaviour (especially relevant to
repairs and trouble shooting), an operational goal to ensure continuity of production (consid-
ering average cost), or a safety goal to protect the plant or staff (considering immediate risk).
The abnormal conditions may be identified as a situation foreseen and evaluated by the sys-
tem designer, who has formulated appropriate responses in procedure instructions that make
up a formal transformation model for the operator, influencing his identification and control-
ling the co-ordination of his responses.
Fourth.  If the conditions are identified as conditions not foreseen and treated by the designer
in the instructional system, the operator must carefully evaluate the plant conditions and pre-
dict plant response to different possible countermeasures according to a highly detailed
physical understanding of the system and a careful appreciation of the relevant goal.  His
transformation model has to include very detailed physical and technological properties of the
plant, which will also be needed to control the co-ordination of his responses.
This model is not intended to be a psychological model of the mental processes of an operator
in a basic task, but a functional model to illustrate general aspects of the operator's situation
at a higher level as seen by the system designer; yet it has some similiarities to a psychologi-
cal model (like that suggested by Gagné (1963), in which the shunting effect is similar to the
branching of tasks in the present model).
The conclusion here will be that the goal of the operator as well as the nature of the mental
transformation model will be fundamentally different in his diverse tasks, varying from a
formal model based upon training, experience or instructions in routine, respectively planned
tasks, to models related to detailed physical and technological properties of the system and
based upon fundamental education in tasks of evaluation and decision.
A computer-controlled graphic display system offers very effective means of presenting plant
data to the operator in a variety of codes related to the actual system conditions, and thus
makes the best use of his data capacity.  Shifting of display coding in accordance with the
working conditions may be a way of breaking up improper routines and assisting the operator
to aim at the appropriate goal.
In his book "A Study of Thinking" Bruner (1956 p. 104) mentions as an example of the clas-
sical human failure Lalande, who failed to discover the planet Neptune in 1795.  Quotation:
The incident in question occurred in 1795, nine years after the discovery of
the planet Uranus, and the principal figure involved was the great French as-
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tronomer Lalande.  In that year Lalande failed to discover the planet Neptune, al-
though the logic of events should have led him to it.  Lalandc was making a map
of the heavens.  Every night he would observe and record the stars in a small area,
and on a following night would repeat the observations.  Once, in a second map-
ping of a partictilar area, he found that the position of one star relative to others in
that part of the map had shifted.  Lalande  was a good astronomer and knew that
such a shift was. unreasonable.  He crossed out his first observation of the shifting
point of light, put a question mark next to his second observation, and let the
matter go.  And so, not until half a century later did Neptune get added to the list
of planets in the solar system.  From the aberrant movement, Lalande might have
made the inference not that an error had been made but that a new planet of the
solar system \%,as present.  But he was reasonable.  And it was more reasonable
to infer that one had made an error in observation than that one had found a new
planet.
This example very nicely illustrates the reactions typical of the human operator in a task of
identification or diagnosis.  In his mental transformation model Lalande did not refer to a
physical system, but he recorded data according to a formal routine.  His goal was to collect
and record numbers, not to study a physical system; and finally he did not even consider the
consequence of his data being correct (the immediate risk) to such a degree that it made him
repeat the measurement.
The conclusion is that the operator's mental transformation model of the plant varies funda-
mentally according to his working conditions, and therefore the coding of data sets will have
to change in accordance with the nature of the actual task.  These changes should be per-
formed not only to ensure a high information input capacity, but also to break the operator's
routines and ensure operation based upon a relevant system model and a proper goal.
4 EXPERIMENTS TO EVALUATE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
The problem is now to describe the mental model of the operator under different operating
conditions and the use of this model in the operator's search for data to form and test hypothe-
ses during the task of identification.
We have found it very difficult to break down this task into elementary parts which would
make it possible to apply data reported from psychological laboratory experiments, and thus
we have felt a great need for man - machine experiments in real industrial environments.
A computer-controlled display system to be installed at the research reactor DR-2 is designed
to serve this purpose, Goodstein (1969) and, to have some basic information for the design of
the experimental displays, a series of experiments are made to evaluate the mental models of
electronic technicians and the way they control the search for state information in trouble-
shooting tasks.
The experiments are made in co-operation with a group of technicians who have a reputation
as efficient trouble shooters, and as we are interested in their mental activities, the experi-
ments are based upon tape recordings of the technicians thinking aloud" during the task.
Objects in the troubleshooting tasks are electronic instruments that have some similiarity to
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industrial plants as they are systems with different co-operating subsystems and have a rea-
sonable variety-in the way they show their response, so that to some extent the fault can be
evaluated directly from "display": multichannel analysers, oscilloscopes and TV-receivers.
As subjects were selected technicians who had a relation to the particular instrument as
qualified users, but not as trouble-shooting specialists.
In the interpretation of the findings from such experiments one of course has to remember
that the goal of instrument trouble shooters differ from that of the plant operators.
From thirty cases in the preliminary set-up of the experiments we have found the procedures
used more systematic than would have been found from judging the subjects' manipulations
alone.
The conclusions drawn from this preliminary work must necessarily be very premature, but
some indications are felt to be justified:
Even in cases where the "display" of information on the CRT of the system (instrument) has
rather obvious features which after some reasoning would indicate very closely the fault and
the appropriate special procedures, and even if these features are mentioned on the recording
by the subject, the only thing he will decide on the basis of the display is probably what sub-
system he has to turn his attention to.
Turning to the subsystem in question, he will normally carry through a sequence of system-
atic routines without considering further information from the initial response of the instru-
ment; he will start with procedures related to his general experience (probability considera-
tions such as: replace vacuum tubes) and proceed to locate deviations (test DC voltages or
wave forms according to general knowledge or diagrams) by procedures related closely to a
model of normal operation of the system; normally reasoning based upon fundamental under-
standing of the circuitry (a model related to system physics) does not seem to be used to any
great extent.
Generally the procedures seem to be a systematic sequence of simple decisions which in
some way minimize the information flow rate needed, so that more complicated evaluations
are avoided.
This may be a warning to display designers: Technicians with experience as system operators
and repairers have normally developed systematic methods, which in most abnormal cases
very efficiently lead to an identification of the fault.
The most likely procedure will be a sequence of simple tests to locate the failing component
by judging deviations in state data from a model of normal operation according to experience.
In his laboratory work the designer and development engineer will normally not relate his
evaluations of system response to simple deviations from a "normal model", but will be
forced to use careful reasoning and evaluation of all information available in system response
in relation to basic understanding, and he should be careful not to design display coding to his
own mental models.
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The experiments indicate that it can be very difficult to break routines that the subjects have
normally found very efficient. ven in cases specially designed to have obvious short-cut
methods, the fault had been found by standard methods.
An important conclusion for our future experiments with computer-generated displays seems
to be that the-displays should be in actual operation for a sufficient time to allow the operator
to form fixed routines.  Not until then will it be possible to judge the efficiency of the dis-
plays in identification procedures in case of complex, risky plant conditions during which
also causes of low probability have to be considered.
5·EXPERIMENTAL COMPUTER-CONTROLLED DISPLAY SYSTEM
According to this conclusion the computer'-controlled display system mentioned to will be
brought into normal operation at the research reactor DR-2, and identification experiments
will be carried out only when the use of a particular display coding has turned into routine.
At the present state of the work four typical categories of mental transformation models are
considered for the display coding to be used in the experiments in real plant environments:
First.  Purely abstract models as generated by the operator from his experience with plant be-
haviour for which a proper coding will be data in easily recognizable patterns.  This type is
suitable for monitoring tasks (failure detection), as reference to normal data values can easily
be included, and corresponds to the operator's perception of conventional meter indications as
patterns (fig. 2).
Secondly.  Functional models that represent the physical relation between data in the set de-
scribing a situation or a subsystem.  These models may be based upon mathematical models
of plant response, and the corresponding displays may, as suggested by Wohl (1967) be based
upon graphic methods like those normally used in textbooks or graphical design methods to
clarify relations between data describing physical processes.  This type may be advantageous
in the task of identifying the abnormal system, as reference to normal relations between data
can be present (fig- 3).
Thirdly.  Models closely related to the technological anatomy of the plant, and which may be
supported by display like flow diagrams and "mini" displays, as also used in conventional
systems.  This type will probably be most suitable for the decision task, where the operator
evaluates his countermeasures, during which evaluation he may need support in judging ap-
propriate manipulations.
Fourth.  Finally other types of abstract models may come into use when special systematic
procedures exist (preplanned procedures or general methods).  The display may support logi-
cal administration of checks performed by the operator, as the test matrix mentioned by Wohl
(1967), or logical reasoning in general, Newmann.(1966).
It is important to bear in mind that the operator has to identify failures in the instruments as
well as failures in the plant, and experience from accidents seems to indicate that the opera-
tors have a tendency not to trust information from the instrumentation when a very improb-
able, but perhaps risky condition is indicated, and therefore displays for detection and identi-
fication based upon primary measuring data should be at the operator's disposal, leaving him
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a possibility of judging the performance of the measuring channels.  In such displays the
model will be represented by the lay-out of data presented rather than by computer-
calculated, derived data.
SUMMARY
A review of accident reports indicates that a critical task of the data display system in an in-
dustrial plant is to support the operator in the identification of hi,5,working conditions in ab-
normal periods.  In this task the operator has to consider large sets of data, and Parameters of
no con- cern to him during normal operation may be of vital importance.
To fully utilize the data input capacity of the human operator it is important that the coding of
data sets presented improperly related to his co mental transformation model. A discussion
based upon a simple model of the operator's performance demonstrates how his mental mod-
els and his goal have to change according to the actual operating conditions, and it is con-
cluded that the data conditioning capability of a process computer may be an efficient tool for
presenting data in a variety of codes to fit his models and to break improper routines.
A great need for information on the nature of the operator's procedures and models is felt, and
identification experiments under real plant conditions are planned. Preliminary experiments
with electronic trouble-shooting tasks demonstrate the difficulty in breaking a procedure that
has turned into routine, and warns the display designer that the diagnostic procedures applied
by system operators are different from those of system designers.
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